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Abstract 
 
Despite continuing efforts to apply existing hazard analysis methods and comply with requirements, 
human errors persist across the nuclear weapons complex.  Due to a number of factors, current retroactive 
and proactive methods to understand and minimize human error are highly subjective, inconsistent in 
numerous dimensions, and are cumbersome to characterize as thorough.  An alternative and proposed 
method begins with leveraging historical data to understand what the systemic issues are and where 
resources need to be brought to bear proactively to minimize the risk of future occurrences.  An 
illustrative analysis was performed using existing incident databases specific to Pantex weapons 
operations indicating systemic issues associated with operating procedures that undergo notably less 
development rigor relative to other task elements such as tooling and process flow.  Future recommended 
steps to improve the objectivity, consistency, and thoroughness of hazard analysis and mitigation were 
delineated. 
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Introduction 
 
While many elements of systems engineering are structured enough to measure at a high degree of fidelity 
and reliability, the human element introduces a distinct level of variability.  Engineers often address the 
human element by neglecting to account for human factors entirely, making gross assumptions 
concerning human factors, or attempting to integrate human factors more fully, while struggling to do so 
in a systematic fashion. 
 
Despite those who may underestimate the role of human factors in the nuclear weapons complex, human 
performance is woven and relied upon in the majority of a weapon’s life cycle.  Human responsibilities 
are significant and include:  weapons design, assembly, disassembly, maintenance, and surveillance.  The 
dependence on human performance, coupled with the potential variability introduced by humans, 
indicates a need to pursue means of systematic human factors analysis and design.  This general need has 
motivated the research described in this report. 
 
A more specific need driving this work is that despite Human Factors support to the Hazard Analysis 
Task Team (HATT) at Pantex, human errors continue to occur in Pantex operations (Kirby, 2003).  Thus, 
it is clear that the current process is not sufficient to identify, analyze and mitigate all potential human 
factors concerns.  A more complete approach would include the investigation of historical data (e.g., 
occurrences and incidents) to derive systemic issues that need consideration.  However, this is not 
currently part of the current analysis process.  Furthermore, human factors and hazard analysts are not 
equipped with supplementary tools and information to support human error analysis and mitigation.  
 
The current research intends to develop a methodology for objective, consistent, and thorough human 
error analysis and mitigation.  It is argued that historical records of human errors are not being used.  
Further, hazard analyses that address human error vary greatly across analysts and programs.  Finally, the 
incident data examined and the hazards analyzed are not as thorough as necessary. 
 
This report summarizes current human error analysis practices.  A description of the proposed method of 
mitigating human error is depicted along with a review of an example implementation.  In addition, 
opportunities for continued work in this area are described.  
 
 
Current Hazard and Human Error Analyses Process 
 
The current process of hazard and human error analysis is depicted in Figure 1, which shows that there 
are two distinct parts to the current analysis process.  One part includes retroactive features (focusing on 
past events) such as the utilization of historical data.  The other part includes proactive features (focusing 
on future events) such as the actual walkthroughs and reporting associated with the hazard analyses 
process. 
 
Although a number of existing incident reporting systems exist within the DOE complex (e.g., ORPS, 
URs, SFIs), their use is not well defined in the current process.  Thus, links to these databases in Figure 1 
are represented as dashed lines.  Formalized links or processes are depicted as solid lines.   
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Figure 1:  Current hazard analysis process.  Solid lines represent formalized/established processes and 
dashed lines are less formal or loosely defined processes. 
 
 
Retroactive Factors 
 
Historical (or archival) data refers to existing information that has been collected by sites such as Pantex 
or other DOE organizations.  Generally, this information has not been collected by human factors experts, 
nor has been designed to meet the specific needs of a human factors analysis.  Nonetheless, there is often 
much that can be learned by reviewing this existing information.  Historical data can include anything that 
an organization regularly collects about its operation such as:  quality control data, architectural plans, 
design specifications and drawings, production records, personnel data records, and most critical for 
hazard analysis, reports from previous hazard analyses and injury and incident/accident reports.  Such 
information can provide a deeper understanding of issues that have caused problems in the past, and can 
help lead the human factors expert to particular areas of concern that need consideration.  However, in the 
current hazard analysis process, the use of historical data is incidental.  Individual hazard analysis team 
members may rely on their memories of past experiences or well-known errors that have occurred, but 
there is not a systematic methodology to incorporate such data into current analyses.   
 
The DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex has a number of historical data sources to draw from.  Specific 
events within the complex are recorded in many different databases, depending on how and where a 
problem was detected.  For example, databases summarizing Significant Finding Investigations (SFIs), 
Unsatisfactory Reports (URs), Test System Investigations (TSIs), all contain information about past 
interactions with various weapon systems across the DOE complex and system life cycle.  Pantex itself 
maintains several reporting systems in which unusual events are recorded.  Pantex also provides input to a 
DOE wide incident reporting system, the Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS).  The 
stated goal for this system is to “provide timely notification to the DOE complex of events that could 
adversely affect:  public or DOE worker health and safety, the environment, national security, DOE's 
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 safeguards and security interests, functioning of DOE facilities, or the Department's reputation” (ORPS 
website, 2003). 
 
Incident reporting systems have become an increasingly common methodology for collecting and tracking 
information about undesired events.  These undesired events (i.e., incidents) include both accidents 
(which are undesired events resulting in injury, damage or serious consequences) and near misses (which 
are those events or unsafe acts where the sequence of events could have caused an accident if it had not 
been interrupted).  The advantage of including information about near-misses in an incident reporting 
system is that the iceberg model (first proposed by Heinrich, 1931) suggests that there is an inverse 
proportionality between the number of major accidents, near-misses and errors.  Thus, an organization or 
system can have a relatively large number of errors, which lead to a fewer number of near misses, which 
result in even fewer accidents.  Relying purely on information from accidents therefore eliminates all of 
the information that can be learned by studying near-misses and errors.  
 
It is important to consider the reporting criteria for a particular database before any conclusions can be 
drawn from the data contained in that database.  The reporting criteria correspond to the conditions under 
which a particular incident needs to be reported in the database.  Incidents not meeting these conditions 
are generally not reported to the incident database, and in fact may not be recorded at all.  These 
conditions are often outcome based, meaning they depend on the final result of an event.  For example, 
the conditions may correspond to particular types of injuries (e.g., any time an employee must report to 
the medical department), costs of damage (e.g., any time more than $5000 worth of damage), significance 
of the event (e.g., any incident which disrupts production schedule), or any other conditions determined to 
be important.  While basing reporting criteria on outcome alone does provide a concrete threshold to use 
in deciding what to report, it can also result in near-misses and errors being excluded from the database.  
Understanding what criteria are used is critical to understanding the data.  In the case of ORPS, Pantex 
has developed their own site criteria, which is documented in Appendix B of the Pantex Plant Standard:  
Event Investigation, Critique Process and Occurrence Reporting (STD-3140; ORPS website, 1998).     
 
Although it is clear that there is a number of existing data sources that contain information about past 
experiences with weapon systems, there does not seem to be a general awareness of how this information 
can be utilized during hazard analyses.  Further, the use of this information is not formally included in the 
current analysis process.  In the current process, a member of the hazard analysis team does not routinely 
access existing data sources for information, and the human factors analyst is not automatically provided 
access to this information.   
 
There may be other potential sources of historical data that are currently not being utilized fully.  For 
example, there is not currently a system in place to capture and share results or information from previous 
hazard analyses.  Although results from hazard analyses are documented in memos, Hazard Analysis 
Reports, and the Weapons Response Database that may be circulated within the system team, analysts 
working on different systems may not be aware of issues that emerged or solutions that had been 
developed.  Thus, different analysts or different system teams must discover for themselves issues that 
may have been previously identified in a previous hazard analysis using resources not necessarily staged 
for this purpose.     
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 Proactive Factors 
 
The goal of the proactive part of the hazard analysis process is to identify and predict potential problems 
with the proposed operations before the process is implemented in the plant.  The hazard analysis consists 
of walkdowns of various parts of the process, with observers from different disciplines watching to try 
and identify any potential issues that need to be addressed.  Despite first-hand experience in the day-to-
day operations, production technicians have a limited role in hazard analyses.  At best, one production 
technician will be recruited to demonstrate tasks being reviewed during process walkdowns.  The 
technician assisting walkdowns may occasionally be prompted for their feedback.  Even if the technician 
is prompted for feedback, there are numerous social factors that may inhibit a candid response. 
 
Trainers, responsible for educating technicians, are more likely to be present during walkdowns.  Clearly 
the depth of knowledge introduced by their presence and input is valuable.  Nevertheless, discrepancies 
can exist between the trainer’s view of how certain operations should be performed and the most current 
manner in which operations are being performed. 
 
Human factors analysts participating in hazard evaluations can come from varied backgrounds and this 
can impact the range and depth of factors analyzed.  For example, a human factors analyst with a focus on 
biomechanics1 may attend more to factors such as the stability of loads above the technician’s shoulders 
or anthropometric factors.  A human factors expert with a background focused on training may be 
sensitive to the complexity of tasks where complex tasks may be more prone to confusion, skill decay, 
and errors.  Varied backgrounds will not only influence attention to potential errors, but the form of 
solution offered to mitigate future errors.  
 
Another factor that can influence the effectiveness of human factors analyses is the level of domain 
knowledge of the analyst.  It is possible that a human factors analyst participating in a walkdown may 
have little experience with the particular weapon system.  Consequently, the human factors analyst may 
have little appreciation for the significance and hazards associated with a given human error.  Further, the 
analyst may have little experience in a domain that must prioritize nuclear explosive safety over worker 
safety.  Again, this can be hard to appreciate for a human factor specialist with experience in areas such as 
industrial ergonomics, which prioritizes minimizing work-related injuries. 
 
A closely related issue to domain knowledge is a lack of general background information going into 
hazard analyses.  Even if the analyst has good domain knowledge, the analyst may not have an objective 
understanding of systemic issues in ongoing Pantex operations.  The analyst may assume certain issues 
are significant when historically they have not been significant.  Consequently the analyst risks 
overlooking significant issues as well as devoting time and energy to problems that are in fact 
insignificant.  Practically speaking, the analyst’s ability to identify potential errors will benefit from an 
objective examination of historical data. 
 
The number of human factors staff participating in a given process walkdown varies.  Some walkdowns 
occur with no human factors analysts present, so the analyst may only receive human factors questions 
(identified by staff who are not human factors experts) that arose during the walkdowns.  On the other 
extreme, a number of human factors analysts may attend a walkdown, and may collaborate in the analysis 
of hazards and human error.  Clearly being absent from walkdowns introduces significant risks in terms 
of potential errors overlooked.  However, the quality of human factors assessments may not necessarily 
correlate with the number of staff present.  Research suggests that the level of any individual’s vigilance 
decreases as three or more collaborators are added (Kanekar, 1982 and Wiener, 1964).   
                                                 
1 The study of mechanics as it relates to the movement of living organisms. 
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There could be an optimum number of human factors staff to support each analysis, but there are many 
practical reasons why this is difficult to achieve.  First, the walkdowns are typically very crowded.  Staff 
representing a wide variety of departments currently attend each walkdown (e.g., surveillance, process 
engineering, tooling, authorization basis, safety, training, production technicians, Department of Energy, 
project management, design agency systems engineers, and several miscellaneous experts (e.g., 
electrostatic discharge experts, gas sampling experts, high explosive experts etc.)).  Crowded walkdowns 
result in cumbersome reviews of processes, since just a few observers can obscure angles necessary to 
view a tool being demonstrated or a component being handled.  Several conversations can be going while 
significant information, such as the description of a task, is being explained.  Questions can be posed that 
had already been addressed because the person posing the question could not hear or see what happened 
or was distracted.  
 
 
General Hazard Analyses 
 
Generally, the current approach to hazard analysis has involved a group of analysts, including a human 
factors analyst, taking an unsystematic look at the system.  Any analyst can raise a potential issue and the 
group then works to develop a way to address that issue.  Because there is no systematic way of 
identifying pertinent issues, many issues are raised based on the past experiences of the particular analysts 
involved.  This could mean that a single past experience is used to isolate causality and justify design 
changes, or a focus on known past problems can result in other issues being missed.  Further, an analyst 
may not recognize an issue that has been previously identified as a concern in another analysis, which is a 
missed opportunity to learn from previous data.   
 
Another concern in the current approach to hazard analysis is that the current walkdown process focuses 
on identifying hazards that are present if the task is performed exactly as written in the procedures.  
However, often the situations during the walkthroughs do not exactly mimic the situations that would be 
faced during actual operations.  Also, there is a general assumption that the procedures are correct and 
unambiguous, and the technicians will be operating under ideal working conditions.  There is little 
opportunity to focus on ways in which the actual performance of a task can vary from the way it is 
described in the procedures. 
 
 
Proposed Method Overview 
 
Figure 2 illustrates a proposed methodology for human factors involvement in the hazard analysis 
process.  Elements common to Figure 2 and those shown earlier in Figure 1 for the current hazard 
analysis process include the retroactive and proactive division of analysis tools, methods, and resources. 
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Figure 2:  Proposed Hazard Analysis Process. 
 
 
An important addition to the retroactive side is the use of information management tools.  A feature 
common to most incident reporting databases is a significant amount of text-based information.  Current 
methods of reviewing such databases are limited to manually reading through a large amount of text to 
extract information and knowledge.  Increasingly, information technology tools have been developed to 
automate this process.  As a result, the current research sought to explore the utility of such technology. 
 
Another feature to contrast between the current process (Figure 1) and the proposed process (Figure 2) is 
the increased amount of information flowing to the proactive half of the hazard analysis process.  This is 
primarily motivated by the observation that hazard analysis staff are provided little to no supplementary 
information prior to the analysis of nuclear weapons processes and tasks resulting in more subjective, 
inconsistent, and incomplete analyses.  Therefore, it was of interest to enhance the effectiveness of 
resources provided to hazard analysis staff. 
 
The proactive side of Figure 2 includes the role of survey or work assessment tools.  Work assessment 
tools include questionnaires and other established methodologies to be used by human factors staff to 
thoroughly, consistently, and objectively review hazards.  Many opportunities exist to leverage lessons 
learned from other industries (e.g., aircraft maintenance) to significantly improve the review of weapons 
processes and tasks. 
 
Task analysis methods have been added that improve the delineation of contextual factors that could 
affect the probability of human error.  Significant research associated with fields known as cognitive work 
analysis (Vicente, 1999), operator function modeling (Mitchell, 1987), and cognitive systems engineering 
(Flach, 1998) have yielded techniques that should be investigated for integration with current hazard 
analysis processes. 
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 Another motivation reflected in Figure 2 involves feedback from proactive analyses to retroactive 
components.  Findings from proactive elements can refine the information collected in retroactive 
resources. 
 
 
Phase I – Example Application and Lessons Learned 
 
The first phase of this research allowed for the exploration of how some of the proposed methodological 
improvements to the process (as shown in Figure 2) could be applied.  The following sections summarize 
the approach, findings and lessons learned for these methodologies.  
 
Approach 
 
Retroactive Data Analysis:  Identification of Systemic Issues 
 
In order to compile information pertaining to human related incidents, several existing databases were 
explored to search for possible error patterns.  The first step was identifying any incident resources and 
databases available throughout DOE that would contain a readily accessible compilation of occurrences 
and reports that would help identify failure patterns within the system.  A number of subject matter 
experts throughout the laboratories – which included hazards analysts, safety specialists and surveillance 
and reliability experts – were consulted to help identify the needed resources.  It was interesting to note 
that although a series of resource databases exist throughout the DOE Complex; many employees are 
unaware that such resources exist.  After researching the existing resources, the data sources that appeared 
to provide the most potential for finding useful information on incidents relating to human error were 
Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS), Significant Findings Investigation (SFI) reports, 
Test System Investigation (TSI) reports, and Unsatisfactory Reports (UR).   
 
The ORPS database contains information about occurrences related to DOE owned and leased facilities, 
the causes of those occurrences, and suggested corrective actions.  However, while this database contains 
a large number of reports, the search interface is difficult to use, which makes relevant information 
cumbersome to find.  A major concern for ORPS, and for many other databases, is that human factors 
analysts cannot rely solely on the categorization of incidents used in the database.  Because different 
people with different areas of expertise are responsible for entering incident reports into the database, 
there is no assurance that all similar incidents will be categorized in the same manner.  The categories 
chosen to code incident causes and contributing factors may be colored by the investigators’ own 
expertise.  For example, what may seem like a human related error to one person may seem like a 
procedure based error to another.  Further, since many of the investigators are not familiar with human 
factors, there may be a tendency for errors to be considered solely human errors instead of fully 
considering the other factors that may have contributed to the incident.   
 
Since the existing categorization system could not reliably be used to run searches through the ORPS 
database, the search for possible error patterns required the manual reading of each incident.  To help 
limit the number of incidents to be reviewed, the scope of the incidents searched was narrowed, with a 
focus on Pantex reports from the most recent years.  The focus on Pantex restricted the incidents to 
weapon assembly and disassembly tasks; while the focus on recent years ensured that any error patterns 
that were detected were not based on causes and problems that were no longer relevant.  After narrowing 
the scope, reports were searched using different keywords and several identification categories included 
in the ORPS database.  While reading through the incidents it became apparent that while there was a 
large array of incident causes listed on the reports, most errors were in some way related to the procedures 
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 that are used.  When this pattern of errors related to procedures and/or policies in relation to nuclear 
weapons operations was identified, the search was broadened to include Pantex reports beginning in 1991. 
 
The Significant Findings Investigation (SFI) reports are typically based on investigations set forth by 
electrical or mechanical problems that are found in a weapon system.  The SFIs were accessed through 
Web FileShare on Sandia’s classified network.  The search was conducted for SFI monthly reports but 
summaries were only available starting in October 2002 (all previous documents were not posted).  These 
summaries stated what SFIs were opened and closed each month.  In addition, short summaries were 
given for each weapon incident that included the fields:  Brief Description, Potential Indicators, and 
Recent Actions/Status.  However, if there was any human attributed error, there was no way of knowing 
from the summaries.  Full reports were available in paper form.  However, there were no references to the 
human component of the system in the reports.  All SFIs referred to mechanical and electrical problems 
inherent to the system. 
 
Test System Investigation (TSI) reports are follow-ups on SFIs that were blamed on the tester and 
encompass other outside factors.  These reports are generally stored in paper folders and are somewhat 
arranged by date and by weapon, consequently, there is no known means to search for specific 
information besides simply reading through all the reports.  The descriptions given are sometimes detailed 
and other times not and the organizational system of all the reports is poor.  In order to find any 
underlying human error component, much interpretation of the reports is needed. 
 
Unsatisfactory reports (UR) are submitted to the military liaisons at the Laboratories by the military for 
further investigation.  If necessary, these reports will become SFIs.  The URs were accessed through the 
Military Liaison link contained in the workbox on the SRN.  The Advance Search option contained 
several search fields, but the only one that appeared to contain human error data was the 
“Maintenance/Handling” choice under the “Probable Cause” field.  The search produced more than 300 
reports.  However, the reports did not have descriptive titles - only report numbers - therefore, all the 
reports had to be read before any determination on underlying causes could be made.  Descriptions were 
detailed in some reports and scarce or blank in others.  It seems that all human error was stored under the 
heading of maintenance/handling and there appeared to be no way to search a whole array of documents 
using a key word.   
 
Information Technology to Assist in Retroactive Analysis 
 
An information technology tool of particular interest was Knowledgist™ (http://www.invention-
machine.com/prodserv/knowledgist.cfm).  The general capability provided by Knowledgist™ is semantic 
indexing of text-based documents.  The developers of the software describe Knowledgist™ as a 
“knowledge-mining” solution.  Various patterns of subject-action-object combinations can be derived 
from the database linked with Knowledgist™.  The tool includes linguistic mechanisms to provide 
summaries of documents.  Summary detail is at the user’s discretion and can vary from one sentence to 
several pages.  Knowledgist™ was viewed as a promising tool to point towards large incident databases 
such as ORPS. 
 
 
Review of Proactive Methodologies 
 
Although several of the researchers supporting the current research were already familiar with some task 
analysis methods, an additional review of such methods was conducted.  The review utilized literature 
databases, internet and intranet resources, and fellow human factors research contacts outside of Sandia 
National Laboratories. 
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As in the case of task analyses, the research team had some knowledge of work assessment tools.  
Nevertheless, an additional review of work assessment tools was conducted as a part of the current 
research.  Further, a review of the literature concerning the use of formalized procedures was conducted 
to better understand the results from the retroactive analysis.  
 
 
Findings 
 
Retroactive Data Analysis 
 
Unexpectedly, one of the hurdles that had to be overcome in an attempt to locate and gain access to the 
desired data sources was the organization and logistics of the approval process for each data source.  Once 
the pools of data that could be used had been identified, additional detailed information and proper access 
had to be acquired in order to locate and review the reports.  This proved to be a difficult task, as there 
appears to be islands of data sources that are not readily available, effectively connected or even properly 
advertised.  Finding the proper contact person for a specific data source was time consuming and 
sometimes ineffective if a person chose to ignore the requests.  In addition, many individuals were 
unaware that these data and databases existed, in part because these resources are not being effectively 
used to provide reliable data on incidents trends and the reports are seemingly just being blindly filed 
away.  Some of the data sources may very well contain the same type of information or even the same 
reported incident, however, they are being compiled in different places, when it would perhaps be best to 
collect them all in an all-inclusive database that can be easily searched and reviewed for proper trend 
analysis. 
 
Most of the search effort was focused on the ORPS database, as it appeared to contain the most 
comprehensive array of reports.  After reading through many reports, it was decided that the pattern of 
errors for the majority of the reports had their root in procedure based issues.  As such, all reports were 
screened for any incidents that included any procedural difficulties or problems that contributed to the 
final incident.  The reports were restricted by date, from 1991-2003 and by facility to BWXT Pantex.  
After reading through more than a hundred reports, different trends within the procedure related problems 
began to emerge.  From the available data, it was decided that the procedure based incidents could be 
divided into six different categories:  lack of procedure or policy, non-defined or easily misinterpreted 
procedures, lack of sufficient training, inadequate administrative controls/different procedures specific to 
area or weapon, conflicting procedures, and procedures not enforced.  These categories, however, are not 
entirely distinctive, as many incidents include several breakdowns within the procedure system.  In 
addition, due to the nature of the descriptions, the different authors’ perspective and the tendency to place 
blame on something or someone leaves the causes and drives of the incidents open for several 
interpretations of the true underlying causes.  The six categories are defined as follows: 
 
Lack of procedure or policy:  This category refers to instances when an action may have been taken 
inappropriately due to the lack of readily available procedures. 
 
Non-defined or easily misinterpreted procedures:  This refers to instances where workers may have 
thought they were following procedures correctly, but in fact did not due the interpretable wording of the 
procedure.  It also refers to instances where a procedure was not clearly defined, or where parts of the 
procedures were not included. 
 
Lack of sufficient training:  This refers to any incidents that occurred due to insufficient worker training, 
improper training or insufficient refresher training. 
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Inadequate administrative controls/ procedures too specific to area or weapon:  Incidents under this 
category occurred due to insufficient administrative controls and included oversights such as failure to 
provide appropriate procedures and safety regulations in all areas, failure to update procedures in all 
locations after standards are changed, and failure to provide generalized specifications that apply to all 
necessary facilities.  It also includes incidents where procedures given for a specific area or weapon were 
in contradiction to similar procedures for other areas or weapons. 
 
Conflicting procedures:  This category includes incidents where workers were expected to refer to other 
documents for essential information within procedures containing reference to incorrect documents or 
where procedures had reference to several other different or conflicting procedures. 
 
Procedures not enforced:  This category refers to procedures that are not properly enforced through other 
physical controls and/or formal administrative aids (such as not providing facility log entry documenting 
turnover of the facility in an area where it is required) and includes failures to coordinate procedures that 
apply to the same situation but are written and applied by personnel with different responsibilities (e.g., 
maintenance and the contractor). 
 
More specific results from ORPS are summarized in Figure 3.  It is evident that procedures not defined or 
easily interpreted are the most common type of incident surrounding confusion or difficulty associated 
with procedures. 
 
 
Percentage of incidents by category
15%
55%
11%
2%
2%
15% Lack of procedure or policy
Non-defined or easily
misinterpreted procedures
Insufficient training
Procedures too specific to
area or weapon
Conflicting procedures
Procedures not enforced
 
 
Figure 3:  Delineation of incidents surrounding confusion or difficulty associated with procedures. 
 
 
The other data sources that were reviewed for incident trends were not as thorough concerning the human 
component of the incident.  As stated previously, the SFI reports did not contain information on any type 
of human interaction with the system.  The TSI reports did include some information on the human 
component, but the reports were not detailed enough to allow for any patterns to emerge.  However, after 
reading through several reports, some procedural issues were evident.  Some human error issues found 
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 were:  Lack of written processing specifications, poor quality inspection, and improperly written 
procedures, thereby supporting the patterns found in the ORPS database.  
 
The Unsatisfactory Reports (URs) did provide some more information on human factors issues, including 
violations of cautions in procedures, improper training, incorrect or interpretable procedures, improper 
installation or assembly, and damage caused by dropped components.  The reports in this database 
centered more on damage to specific parts.  In most cases, the human component of the system was not 
thoroughly investigated; therefore, the underlying trends of human related issues could not be determined.  
However, the results of the report review did concur with the findings from the ORPS database as about 
60% of the incidents reviewed in the database that related to human or maintenance handling issues (i.e., 
those reports found under the “Maintenance/Handling” choice under the “Probable Cause” field) were 
related to procedure problems.  Nevertheless, the search for reports listing human related incidents would 
have been more complete if key word searches had been possible.  A more detailed search of the available 
reports in this database would probably provide further results. 
 
 
Information Technology 
 
While offering promising features, the utility of Knowledgist™ was low for this application.  ORPS has a 
web search interface which gathers information from the ORPS database itself.  Knowledgist™ needs to 
have access to the database directly and consequently Knowledgist™ could initially only provide reports 
for the web content.  The administrators of ORPS could not provide direct access to the ORPS database in 
time for this first project year.  However, a less automated and temporary solution was to use the ORPS 
user interface to manually download ORPS search results and compile a local (i.e., on a Sandia machine) 
database.  As a result, the compiled and local database was accessible to Knowledgist™.  Even so, 
however, the results obtained through Knowledgist™ were found to be less effective than manually 
reading the reports. 
 
 
Task Analysis Methods 
 
Kirwan and Ainsworth (1992) define task analysis as, “the study of what an operator (or team of 
operators) is required to do, in terms of actions and/or cognitive processes, to achieve a system goal.”  
Traditional task analysis methods have been described as normative (Vicente, 1999), and use clear 
constraints (e.g., tools available, system design features) to describe how the tasks should be performed.  
While this is an inherent part of developing and analyzing processes, it is void of many variables that 
could significantly impact human performance.  In addition, normative approaches often consist of 
erroneous assumptions (e.g., “it works for me, so it will work for everyone else”).  
 
Alternatives to normative approaches have emerged due to a gradual transition to a greater reliance on 
automation, where it is not always possible to observe everything that an operator must perform.  
Although many tasks in the weapons domain are observable (e.g., removing bolts, connecting wires), 
many less observable tasks exist and are increasing, as in the use of Interactive Electronic Procedures.  As 
a result, task analyses are less straightforward and consist of more subtleties that have prompted human 
factors engineers to pursue alternatives to normative task analysis. 
 
A consequence of a strong reliance on normative approaches is the fragile means of responding to human 
error.  If an error occurs, where a human performs the task different from the way it “should” have been 
performed, a common conclusion is that the human was negligent and they need refresher training.  
However, training is not a reliable predictor of human performance (Bailey, 1989).  While training is 
necessary and valuable, it should not be a dominant means of mitigating human error. 
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An alternative to training is to assess the context and environmental factors associated with a task.  Simon 
(1981) uses the analogy of an ant walking across sand to illustrate this notion.  Like an ant, a human can 
be viewed behaviorally as a simple system.  Over time, however, the complexity of the human’s behavior 
is consistent with the complexity of the environment.  An ant may not walk in a straight line across sand 
due to the contours or other factors in the sand (see Figure 4).  Accounting for these “contours” with 
respect to human performance is a central objective common to many of the more recent advances in task 
analyses. 
 
 
Figure 4:  Simon’s (1981) analogy of an ant’s path influenced by its environment. 
 
 
Methodologically, a common feature of modern task analyses is the use of field studies.  Field studies 
involve the observation and interaction with subject matter experts (SMEs) in their natural environment.  
In order the extract the subtleties of complex task domains the traditional method of observing 
performance remains but is augmented by a greater emphasis on interacting with the SMEs.  Such 
interaction typically includes semi-structured interviews or dialogue between the analyst and the SMEs.  
Analysts may be prepared with general issues to discuss, but the specific flow of the discussion can 
follow topics or concepts as they arise. 
 
One descriptive task analysis technique is Operator Function Modeling (Mitchell, 1987; Brannon & 
Narayanan, 1997).  The product of this technique is a descriptive representation of activities.  The 
activities may be multiple and concurrent, and perhaps performed by more than one person.  The 
representation is typically a network diagram of hierarchic and heterarchic activities.  An example is 
shown in Figures 5 and 6 for a wastewater supervisory control task.  Hierarchically, the highest level is 
typically the goals or task objectives.  The model delineates the more specific activities that support that 
goal working down to more specific tasks such as using controls or reading displays.  The heterarchic 
feature of the model accommodates the description of concurrent activities. 
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Figure 5:  Higher level of OFM of wastewater supervisory control operations  
(Brannon & Narayanan, 1997). 
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3.   Relevant sector found
4.   Potentially clogged pump
5.   Relevant pump not on display
6.   Is the plot a step function or more linear?
7.   Relevant plot found
8.   Plot is more linear
9.   Flow rate abnormal but may stabilize
10. Need second opinion
11.  Safe to moderate weather conditions
12.  Condition not improving
13.  Need second opinion
14.  Condition continuing to grow worse
15.  Clogged pump found
16.  Severe weather (e.g., flood)
17.  Abnormal flow rate
18.  Condition warrants physical input
19.  Step function
20.  Concur with supervisor intervention
 
 
Figure 6:  OFM decomposition of situation awareness procedures (Brannon & Narayanan, 1997). 
 
 
Review of Work Assessment Tools 
 
There are a significant number of tools that have been developed to help perform human factors and 
hazard assessments.  These tools range from generic checklists that can be used to identify potential 
hazards in a generic work environment to tools that have been specifically designed for use in a specific 
industry.  For example, Hammer (1989) provides generic checklists that can be used to help assess 
common industrial and occupational hazards, and Chervak and Drury (1995) developed an ergonomic 
audit program specifically designed to assess the hazards involved in aviation maintenance and inspection 
tasks.  The goal of all of these tools is to provide analysts with a consistent, objective and thorough means 
of looking at a system and identifying potential problems.   
 
Developing a set of tools for use in hazard walkthroughs will require more investigation into how existing 
tools can be adapted for use in the specific Pantex environment.  This adaptation will draw from existing 
work assessment tools, including a tool developed by Human Factors staff at Los Alamos National 
Laboratories which includes an annotated list of relevant Issues and Considerations that may impact 
human performance along with a checklist to be used during walkthroughs (Pond, Gilmore and 
Houghton, 2003).  Further, information gleaned from retroactive analyses can be used to further tailor 
these tools towards specific hazards.    
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 Literature Review of Human Performance Involving Formalized Procedures 
 
Marcus, Cooper and Sweller (1996) define understanding of instructions as the ability to follow 
instructions successfully and readily.  They suggest that understanding instructions is influenced by two 
factors which interact with each other and with relevant characteristics of the human information 
processing system:  the intrinsic complexity of the information, and the manner in which the information 
is presented.  Specifically, information that is too complex or that is presented in a confusing manner may 
overload the working memory of the person using the instructions.  Thus, working memory capacity may 
be the limiting factor in understanding instructions and solving problems (Sweller, 1994).  Understanding 
is promoted by ensuring that the information does not contain multiple elements that must be considered 
simultaneously, and by presenting the information in a manner that does not impose a heavy cognitive 
load (Marcus, Cooper and Sweller, 1996).   
  
There is a considerable body of research into the design and use of instructions in work domains.  The 
design of instructions is similar to the design of any product.  Thus, guidelines for good software and 
product design are all applicable when designing instructions or procedures.  Information pertaining to the 
design of good technical documents is also relevant and should be incorporated when writing instructions.  
There are many references that summarize good technical writing principles (e.g., Haydon, 1995; Hartley, 
1994; Schoff and Robinson, 1984; Wright, 1977) that can be applied when writing work instructions.    
 
Airline maintenance is similar to the work being done at Pantex in that both involve highly proceduralized 
tasks for high consequence systems.  While an error at Pantex may result in a nuclear weapons accident, 
an error in the airline maintenance environment may result in the loss of a commercial jet.  There has 
been research addressing the design of good airline maintenance workcards (Drury and Sarac, 1997; 
Patel, Drury and Lofgren, 1994).  In addition, previous research has indicated that improving the format 
and/or layout of airline workcards results in improved comprehension of the instructions (Drury, Sarac 
and Kritkausky, 1998).   
 
Patel, Prabhu and Drury (1993) developed a taxonomy describing the important issues in documentation 
design for work instructions.  The four basic categories in this taxonomy are:  information readability, 
information content, information organization and physical handling and environmental factors.  
Information readability refers to typographic layout of the documentation, as well as conventions 
concerning sentences, words and letters.  Information content is concerned with what information to give, 
how to give it, and in what order so that the documentation is appropriate, accurate, complete and easily 
comprehensible to the users.  Information organization refers to how the information is categorized (e.g., 
categories of different types of information are clear and distinct) within the document.  Physical handling 
and environmental factors refers to ensuring that the form in which the instructions are presented is 
compatible with the working environment.  It is important to remember that these issues apply to all 
documentation, whether presented on paper or on computer-based systems.  Patel, et al. (1995) compared 
an original paper based workcard system to an improved paper-based system and to a computer-based 
system.  They found that the computer-based system was easier to understand, made it easier to find 
information, increased organization and consistency of information and increased overall workcard 
usability.  However, these same improvements were also found in the improved paper-based system, 
suggesting that it is the improvements in readability, content and organization that improve performance 
rather than the medium in which it is presented.   
 
Ramos and Gilmore (2003) performed a usability evaluation of the Interactive Electronic Procedures 
(IEP) system that is being introduced at Pantex.  The IEP system consists of hardware and software that 
will provide all work instructions to the Pantex technicians electronically.  The electronic presentation 
will help ensure that information readability and information organization are consistent across 
procedures.  The IEP may also support improved information content by ensuring that additional support 
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 information is readily accessible to the technicians who need this information.  However, since there has 
not been a concerted effort to rewrite the procedures before they are entered into IEP, there remains a 
concern that any problems (e.g., confusing descriptions, references to other documents, missing or 
incomplete instructions) that exist in the current paper version of the procedures will simply be carried 
over into the electronic version.                   
 
 
Lessons Learned 
 
Retroactive Data Analysis 
 
As was previously stated, the data sources were not easily retrieved due to the logistics of finding and 
gaining access to the desired information in all the separate and scattered sources of data.  In addition, the 
software interface for the ORPS database was excessively cumbersome and complicated.  Much time was 
spent trying to manipulate and become familiar with the database interface in order to retrieve the 
necessary reports.  Also, downloading the reports proved to be a burdensome task, as in some cases the 
search results were so large that the downloading time was incredibly lengthy.  The interface of the 
database needs much improvement in order to be able to provide a more user-friendly interface that 
allows for less cumbersome searching.  
 
In addition, compiling a list of all the available data sources, with a categorization or explanation of each 
one’s data collection purpose, would facilitate trend analysis across the complex.  As it is right now, it is 
not very clear what the overall purpose of all the data sources are and how they differ from one another or 
even what purpose they serve in trend analysis, if any.  In fact, it seems that some reports, such as TSIs, 
are just being stored away and are in no way being compiled for future analysis.  
 
The content of the reports was also limited in its utility with respect to human error analysis.  The 
categorization varied significantly between data sources and within the data sources themselves.  For 
example, there were no definite descriptive categories within the ORPS database and what someone may 
have considered to be an administrative control error another individual may have considered a technician 
error.  As such, it was difficult to look for trends based on the direct cause categorization without reading 
through a whole report.  
 
Reports need to be structured in a manner that facilitates trend analysis.  Currently, the reports do not 
generate enough depth to analyze the incident and provide corrective actions beyond training and 
reprimands.  Often, latent causes are present throughout incidents that are not directly identifiable and a 
thorough analysis of events that occurred prior to an incident may help bring out hazards that can be 
controlled to avoid similar future incidents.  Simply providing training or blaming an individual does not 
address the larger systemic issues that may be present.  Therefore, the right questions need to be asked 
during an incident reporting investigation, in addition to providing distinct categories with appropriate 
descriptions and more detailed analysis of the probable causes.  This is where a well-structured data 
collection device can assure that the appropriate information is collected, which will allow the analysis of 
incidents and a proactive approach to accident prevention. 
 
As previously mentioned, a problem with the reports available from the data sources, particularly those 
from the ORPS database, was that they are written with a bias toward attributing blame.  This not only 
becomes an issue during the investigative part of the incident, but it also affects the workers’ motivation 
to report an incident.  Most individuals are not going to report an incident in a corporate culture where 
blame will most likely be attributed to themselves or fellow workers or when they will be punished for 
making the report.  The purpose of the reports should not be to “point the finger” at someone in order to 
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 protect the overall process, but rather to compile incidents in order to find problems - overt as well as 
latent - within the overall system.  Another issue is that most reports are written by a third party, who has 
interpreted the explanations of the people involved in the incident in order to complete the investigation.  
It would be advantageous to provide a section in the report where the individuals involved are allowed to 
report their own version of what occurred.  
 
 
Information Technology 
 
With regard to information technology tools and specifically lessons learned with Knowledgist™, it is 
believed that more useful software will soon become available.  Areas of automated linguistics and 
natural language processing are being researched more heavily and it is likely therefore that this work will 
yield more enabling tools.  Nevertheless, this is not to say that Knowledgist™ has been dismissed as 
useless.  More time is needed to explore the utility of the results produced by Knowledgist™. 
 
 
Task Analysis Methods 
 
A review of various task analysis methodologies in the literature reveals several common elements.  First, 
an emphasis is placed on performing field studies in the expert’s natural environment.  Second, the 
analyst must interact with the subject matter expert to some capacity in order to elicit their unique 
knowledge.  Finally, the product results in a descriptive representation of the experts’ activities. 
 
To some degree the review of nuclear weapons operations is consistent with the literature’s descriptions 
associated with “field studies.”  Experts participate and high fidelity trainers are used along with the same 
tools used to perform maintenance tasks.  In the interest of easing some of the administrative burdens 
associated with security, walkthroughs are typically conducted outside of the most secure areas in what 
are referred to as “training bays.”  It would be ideal with respect to fidelity to conduct reviews of 
operations in the actual bays and cells.  This is not to say that observing actual operations is not possible.  
If specific issues of higher priority are of interest with a greater need to evaluate what is being done “on 
the line,” then arrangements can be made to observe actual nuclear weapons operations to resolve such 
issues.  Nevertheless, given the administrative requirements associated with such a visit, this is 
understandably burdensome. 
 
 
 
Path Forward 
 
Phase II 
 
With advances in automated processing of text databases, the goal to reduce manual reading of large and 
complex databases will likely be fulfilled in the near term.  Software that automatically scans and 
structures large and complex text databases continues to be developed.  Continued investigation into 
information technology software is warranted.  As noted earlier, tools like Knowledgist™ need more time 
and research to determine their utility.  One hurdle that must be addressed is the connection between tools 
such as Knowledgist™ and web-based databases such as ORPS.  Phase II will include efforts to close this 
gap and facilitate open and more comprehensive searches.  Such effort will include work with database 
administrators to establish secure network connections between machines loaded with information 
technology tools and incident database servers. 
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Phase II will also include the development of a prototype tool for use in proactive analyses.  This tool will 
merge the methodologies associated with modern task analysis and the work assessment tools discussed 
earlier.  The outcome would be a tool designed for human factors analysts supporting hazard analysis task 
teams (HATT) evaluating weapons operations at Pantex. 
 
The information recorded in databases including ORPS is cumbersome to review for the purpose of 
deriving systemic issues.  The content recorded in the incident reports is influenced significantly by the 
forms and tools reporters are required to use.  As a result, Phase II will include the development of 
prototype incident reporting forms.  The forms will be designed to place a minimal time and labor burden 
on those reporting incident details, while at the same time facilitate the recording of incident data that is 
well staged for subsequent analyses.  
 
 
Phase III 
 
A central objective in Phase III will be to progress toward a more centralized retroactive database for 
human factors and hazard analysts.  Currently there are many separate resources of information that could 
provide insight as to the variables contributing to incidents of human error.  Such “islands of information” 
are not designed for use by human factors analysts, and the lack of integration further inhibits the utility 
of the resources.  The conceptual idea for a more usable and integrated resource is known as the 
Technician Error Reporting System (TERS).  The goal of such a system would be to record information 
about near-misses and errors, in addition to reporting incidents that have occurred. 
 
Users and contributors to TERS would include:  human factors engineers, hazard analysts, safety 
engineers, production technicians, and production technician trainers.  Input from production technicians 
is well understood to be a sensitive concept.  Still, this should not inhibit progress toward a reporting 
system that maintains anonymity, blocks repercussions, and most importantly publishes critical contextual 
factors surrounding errors or near misses.  If such a system can be instituted in the aircraft maintenance 
community (Aviation Safety Recording System, NASA), it may be possible to institute such a system in 
the nuclear weapons community as well. 
 
Human factors engineers can utilize a system like TERS to reflect findings from proactive analyses.  
Through the interaction with technicians, trainers and other general staff during processes like process 
walkdowns, many insights can be gained that help shape the context and environmental constraints 
associated with nuclear weapons work.  Such insights can be captured in TERS for use in the future for 
development of subsequent versions of task analysis tools and methods. 
 
There are many insights to be derived from other domains such as aircraft maintenance in terms of the 
design of a reporting system.  Critical features such as the form of questions to prompt those entering 
information need to be delineated in Phase III. 
 
Although a proposed new database would be developed, the other, existing databases (e.g., ORPS) would 
remain useful.  An objective then would be to bring structure to the use of data from other sources and 
formalize the means of networking such data with TERS. 
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Conclusion 
 
The reliance on human effectiveness is a significant component in the domain of nuclear weapons 
maintenance.  The human represents the most significant source of variability as illustrated by a steady 
stream of incidents related to human error reported across the nuclear weapons complex.  The current 
hazard analysis process and efforts to control human error lack consistency, thoroughness, and 
objectivity. 
 
Considerable opportunities exist to leverage historical data and objective analysis tools to facilitate more 
targeted and thorough analyses of human error.  Human factors and hazard analysts can be equipped with 
rich background information and effective tools that can help them to assess and control human error.  
The current report offers short, near, and long-term solutions that could enhance the current means of 
hazard analysis and human error mitigation.  
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APPENDIX A:  List of ORPS Reports by Category 
 
List of ORPS Reports by Category 
 
A C D E F G 
Lack of 
procedure/ 
Policy 
Not Specific or 
Defined - Easily 
Misinterpreted 
Not Known 
by Worker 
(no training) 
Specific to 
Buildings, 
Weapons, etc. 
Involve Numerous 
Documents or Refer 
to Numerous 
Documents 
Not Enforced
 
 
      
Total: 77 Total: 289 Total: 58 Total: 11 Total: 12 Total: 79 
Percent: 15% Percent: 55% Percent: 11% Percent: 2% Percent: 2% Percent: 15%
1991-0012 1991-0039 1991-1024 1991-0032 1993-0020 1991-1032 
1991-0020 1991-1004 1992-0023 1992-0067 1994-0028 1992-0075 
1991-0022 1991-1011 1992-0058 1992-0074 1995-0032# 1993-0013 
1991-0028 1991-1041 1992-0078 1993-0022 1996-0129 1993-0031 
1991-0034 1991-1043 1993-0035 1994-0019 1996-0187% 1993-0036* 
1991-0035 1992-0003 1993-0042 1995-0006 1997-0037 1993-0060 
1991-0036 1992-0007 1993-0044 1995-0010 1998-0006% 1994-0016 
1991-0038 1992-0019 1994-0009 1996-0011 1998-0008* 1994-0069* 
1991-0040 1992-0023 1994-0076 1997-0064 1998-0060* 1994-0124* 
1991-0041 1992-0028 1994-0090 2001-0002 1999-0021% 1994-0163* 
1991-0041 1992-0033 1994-0112 2001-0098 1999-0051* 1994-0167* 
1991-1033 1992-0036 1994-0127  1999-0077 1994-0168* 
1992-0020 1992-0039 1994-0151   1995-0039 
1992-0023 1992-0050 1995-0209   1995-0051* 
1992-0030 1992-0052 1995-0210   1995-0060* 
1992-0035 1992-0055 1996-0068   1995-0103* 
1992-0053 1992-0058 1996-0069   1995-0120* 
1992-0063 1992-0059 1996-0072   1995-0122* 
1993-0029 1992-0064 1996-0107   1995-0124* 
1993-0048 1992-0077 1996-0108   1995-0132 
1993-0048 1992-0080 1996-0115   1995-0137* 
1994-0004 1992-0081 1996-0122   1995-0153* 
1994-0038 1992-0083 1996-0129   1995-0159* 
1994-0108 1993-0008 1996-0153   1995-0176* 
1994-0118 1993-0011 1996-0206   1995-0195* 
1994-0129 1993-0012 1996-0236   1995-0197* 
1994-0145 1993-0028 1997-0073   1995-0202* 
1994-0152 1993-0041 1997-0077   1995-0205* 
1994-0170 1993-0045 1998-0018   1995-0211 
1994-0172 1993-0051 1998-0048   1995-0227* 
1995-0011 1993-0057 1998-0087   1995-0228* 
1995-0079 1993-0063 1998-0091   1995-0229* 
1995-0083 1993-0064 1999-0008   1996-0001* 
1995-0090 1994-0007 1999-0020   1996-0008 
1995-0108 1994-0014* 1999-0026   1996-0016* 
1995-0110 1994-0022 1999-0049   1996-0017* 
1995-0144 1994-0026 2000-0027   1996-0018* 
1995-0215 1994-0027 2000-0032   1996-0020* 
1995-0226 1994-0028 2000-0033   1996-0022* 
1996-0045 1994-0043 2000-0078   1996-0023* 
1996-0084 1994-0054 2000-0081   1996-0024* 
1996-0183 1994-0056 2000-0087   1996-0044 
1996-0184 1994-0059 2000-0093   1996-0056* 
1996-0206 1994-0068 2001-0037   1996-0061* 
1996-0225 1994-0074 2001-0047   1996-0066* 
1996-0231 1994-0076 2001-0058   1996-0083* 
1997-0019 1994-0090 2001-0078   1996-0096 
1997-0054 1994-0095 2001-0088   1996-0098* 
1997-0068 1994-0096 2001-0097   1996-0124* 
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 A C D E F G 
Lack of 
procedure/ 
Policy 
Not Specific or 
Defined - Easily 
Misinterpreted 
Not Known 
by Worker 
(no training) 
Specific to 
Buildings, 
Weapons, etc. 
Involve Numerous 
Documents or Refer 
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1997-0104 1994-0104^ 2002-0005   1996-0131 
1998-0007 1994-0105 2002-0013   1996-0178* 
1998-0061 1994-0112 2002-0033   1996-0216* 
1998-0063 1994-0125 2002-0044   1996-0239 
1998-0070 1994-0126 2002-0046   1997-0004* 
1999-0001 1994-0127 2002-0062   1997-0007* 
1999-0009 1994-0132 2002-0063   1997-0016* 
1999-0038 1994-0133 2003-0007   1997-0033* 
1999-0052 1994-0137& 2003-0023   1997-0048 
1999-0071 1994-0139    1997-0060* 
1999-0082 1994-0140    1997-0070 
2000-0003 1994-0150    1997-0077 
2000-0024 1994-0155    1997-0086* 
2000-0041 1994-0156    1997-0094 
2000-0056 1994-0171    1998-0009 
2000-0067 1994-0175    1998-0034 
2000-0098 1994-0195    1998-0039@ 
2001-0034 1994-0196    1998-0058* 
2001-0085 1994-0197    1998-0075 
2001-0092 1995-0010    1998-0076* 
2002-0003 1995-0014^    1998-0079 
2002-0033 1995-0020^    1998-0090 
2002-0037 1995-0034    1999-0023 
2002-0056 1995-0036    1999-0032@ 
2002-0059 1995-0043    1999-0033 
2003-0019 1995-0056    1999-0041* 
2003-0021 1995-0057    2000-0025 
2003-0027 1995-0063    2000-0064 
 1995-0071    2001-0064* 
 1995-0094    2002-0064 
 1995-0113     
 1995-0114     
 1995-0121     
 1995-0126     
 1995-0128     
 1995-0130     
 1995-0132     
 1995-0135     
 1995-0143     
 1995-0150     
 1995-0152     
 1995-0160     
 1995-0170     
 1995-0174     
 1995-0177     
 1995-0181     
 1995-0184     
 1995-0194     
 1995-0203     
 1995-0206     
 1995-0207     
 1995-0210     
 1995-0217     
 1995-0223     
 1995-0225     
 1996-0029     
 1996-0037     
 1996-0039     
 1996-0040     
 1996-0054     
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 1996-0059     
 1996-0065     
 1996-0067     
 1996-0085     
 1996-0102     
 1996-0104     
 1996-0109     
 1996-0112     
 1996-0126     
 1996-0130     
 1996-0134     
 1996-0147     
 1996-0162     
 1996-0166     
 1996-0171     
 1996-0172     
 1996-0173     
 1996-0186     
 1996-0189     
 1996-0205     
 1996-0209     
 1996-0224     
 1996-0228     
 1996-0237     
 1997-0010     
 1997-0011     
 1997-0028     
 1997-0029     
 1997-0031     
 1997-0045     
 1997-0046     
 1997-0065     
 1997-0072     
 1997-0073     
 1997-0082     
 1997-0085     
 1997-0088     
 1997-0092     
 1997-0098     
 1997-0099     
 1997-0100     
 1997-0101     
 1997-0103     
 1998-0011     
 1998-0012*     
 1998-0016     
 1998-0019     
 1998-0020     
 1998-0021     
 1998-0032     
 1998-0033     
 1998-0035     
 1998-0040     
 1998-0047     
 1998-0055     
 1998-0056     
 1998-0057     
 1998-0059     
 1998-0062     
 1998-0064     
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 1998-0066     
 1998-0069     
 1998-0071     
 1998-0073     
 1998-0074     
 1998-0079     
 1998-0081     
 1998-0083     
 1998-0084     
 1999-0002     
 1999-0005     
 1999-0011     
 1999-0015     
 1999-0016     
 1999-0020     
 1999-0025     
 1999-0029     
 1999-0030     
 1999-0035     
 1999-0042     
 1999-0044     
 1999-0050     
 1999-0060     
 1999-0066     
 1999-0067     
 1999-0069     
 1999-0073     
 1999-0078     
 1999-0081     
 1999-0086     
 1999-0087     
 1999-0088     
 1999-0089     
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 2000-0011     
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 2000-0023     
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 2000-0028     
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 2001-0004     
 2001-0005     
 2001-0005(MHC)     
 2001-0006     
 2001-0008     
 2001-0010     
 2001-0012     
 2001-0013     
 2001-0022     
 2001-0029     
 2001-0045     
 2001-0051     
 2001-0055     
 2001-0057     
 2001-0058     
 2001-0059     
 2001-0062%     
 2001-0069     
 2001-0071     
 2001-0076     
 2001-0079     
 2001-0090     
 2001-0091     
 2001-0095     
 2001-0097     
 2001-0101     
 2001-0105     
 2001-0106     
 2001-0108     
 2001-0111     
 2001-0113     
 2001-0115     
 2002-0002     
 2002-0004     
 2002-0007     
 2002-0008     
 2002-0009     
 2002-0010     
 2002-0013     
 2002-0018     
 2002-0021     
 2002-0025     
 2002-0026     
 2002-0027     
 2002-0031     
 2002-0034     
 2002-0040     
 2002-0043     
 2002-0049     
 2002-0063     
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 2003-0006     
 2003-0007     
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 2003-0016     
 2003-0018     
 2003-0026     
 2003-0028     
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31 
  
Distribution: 
 
1 MS0313 Paul Yourick   06340 
1 MS0405 Susan Camp   12346 
1 MS0405 Celestino Casaus  12346 
1 MS0405 Martha Charles-Vickers 12346 
1 MS0405 Alton Donnell   12346 
1 MS0405 Todd R. Jones   12346 
1 MS0405 Teresa Sype   12346 
1 MS0428 David Carlson   12300 
1 MS0428 Victor Johnson  12340 
1 MS0457 Bess Campbell-Domme 02000 
1 MS0492 Martin Fuentes  12332 
1 MS0492 Michael Mclean  12332 
1 MS0492 Brad Mickelsen  12332 
1 MS0637 Everett Saverino  12336 
1 MS0829 Janet Sjulin   12337 
1 MS0830 Bobby G. Baca  12335 
1 MS0830 Kathleen Diegert  12335 
1 MS0830 Louise Weston  12335 
1 MS9014 Alice Johnson   08241 
 
1 MS9018 Central Technical Files 8945-1 
2 MS0899 Technical Library  9616 
 
32 
